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INTRODUCTION 
 For most people, the mention of organized crime conjures up thoughts of 
criminal enterprises portrayed in films like The Godfather and Casino. In films, 
Hollywood screenwriters can clearly define for the audience the scope and 
structure of the organizations and the roles of the organizations’ members. Un-
fortunately, it is much easier for screenwriters to dream up an organized struc-
ture for a fictional criminal enterprise than it is for investigators to discern any 
such structure for a real criminal enterprise. A prosecutor who is unable to ex-
plain to a jury the scope and structure of any such enterprise faces an uphill bat-
tle in prosecuting the members of said enterprise. Frequently, investigations re-
sult in findings that tend to show connections between crimes and defendants; 
however, the investigators are often unable to provide any coherent explanation 
as to the overall scope and structure of a clearly-defined criminal enterprise car-
rying out those crimes. 
While the discussion here applies to all forms of organized crime, for the 
sake of clarity and brevity, this Article will discuss these issues as they relate to 
one particular form of criminal organization: staged-accident insurance fraud 
rings. Long gone are the days when the Las Vegas Strip was lined with mob-
controlled casinos. Nevertheless, organized crime is far from dead in Nevada. 
There is no shortage of criminal enterprises organized for the purposes of carry-
ing out offenses such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, and sex traffick-
ing. Since those trafficking organizations are well covered by the media and are 
not strangers to articles appearing in legal journals, this Article will instead fo-
cus on the lesser-discussed and little-known, yet surprisingly prevalent, staged 
automobile accident insurance fraud rings. 
Prosecutors are often confronted with difficult questions as to the manner 
in which the members of such organizations should be criminally charged for 
their unlawful acts. Should all members of a criminal organization be charged 
for all of the crimes committed by its members throughout the duration of the 
organization’s existence, regardless of whether the individual being charged 
was a member of the organization when some of those crimes were committed? 
Is each member criminally culpable for only those crimes committed by the or-
ganization during his or her time with the organization? Should each member 
be charged only for crimes in which he or she personally participated? 
 This Article will provide a thorough discussion of charging issues that arise 
in the prosecution of members of criminal organizations. Specifically, it will 
focus on issues that are related to joinder of charges or offenses, joinder of de-
fendants, multiple conspiracies, coconspirator vicarious liability, and racketeer-
ing conspiracies, with an emphasis on relevant Nevada law. A thorough analy-
sis of applicable law and relevant issues will provide attorneys in Nevada with 
a framework for charging organized crime cases. This Article will also provide 
guidance for jurisdictions with laws similar to Nevada’s. As discussed below in 
greater detail, Nevada’s racketeering laws are based on federal laws, as well as 
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on legislation from Arizona and Illinois. As explained in greater detail below, 
where the Nevada laws were based on federal laws, Nevada courts confronted 
with statutory interpretation issues regarding Nevada racketeering statutes can 
logically look to the federal courts’ interpretation of federal racketeering stat-
utes; where the Nevada laws were based on other sources, the federal courts’ 
interpretation of federal racketeering statutes may have little bearing on the in-
terpretation of state racketeering statutes. 
 This Article will begin by providing a general overview of staged-accident 
insurance fraud. It will also provide a detailed description of an infamous 
staged-accident ring that operated in Southern California in the 1990s. This Ar-
ticle will then use that particular ring—and hypothetical variations of it—to 
help illustrate and discuss the charging issues that arise in these types of cases. 
Finally, it will discuss statutory and case law on joinder of offenses, joinder of 
defendants, multiple conspiracies, coconspirator vicarious liability, and racket-
eering conspiracies, with a specific emphasis on establishing the manner in 
which such crimes can be charged. 
I.   STAGED AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT INSURANCE FRAUD 
A.   Overview and Examples 
 For nearly a century, individuals have been staging automobile accidents 
for the purpose of submitting fraudulent insurance claims.1 The nature of the 
schemes varies. In its most benign form, acquaintances simply agree to crash 
their own vehicles into each other and report the incident to their insurers as an 
accident. Other schemes, however, are far more repugnant. In 2014, David Ste-
vens was arrested for allegedly extorting seniors out of money by staging au-
tomobile accidents in Southern California and demanding that they pay for bo-
gus repairs.2 In 2015, a pregnant woman staged an accident with the assistance 
of her husband and a friend. The woman was reported to have used pillows to 
protect her unborn child when she intentionally rammed her vehicle into anoth-
er.3 
This Article focuses on schemes far more complex than those mentioned 
above; these schemes are carried out by oddball criminal organizations that of-
ten include greedy attorneys, crooked health care providers, con artists, and fi-
nancially desperate individuals. For example, in 2013, after a three-year inves-
                                                        
1  See generally KEN DORNSTEIN, ACCIDENTALLY, ON PURPOSE: THE MAKING OF A PERSONAL 
INJURY UNDERWORLD IN AMERICA (1996). 
2  Jason Kandel et al., Man Extorts Drivers in “Staged Accident” Scheme: Police, NBC SO. 
CAL. (Jan. 30, 2014, 2:23 AM), http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/Man-Stages-Bog 
us-Crashes-Extorts-Drivers-242676961.html [https://perma.cc/27VD-ZE6T]. 
3  Eamonn Duff, Ghenoua Fadel Avoids Jail After Staging Crash While Pregnant in Insur-
ance Scam, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Nov. 18, 2015, 2:45 PM), http://www.smh.com.au/ 
nsw/ghenoua-fadel-avoids-jail-after-staging-crash-while-pregnant-in-insurance-scam-2015 
1117-gl1k5d.html [https://perma.cc/C2ER-BVD5]. 
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tigation, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida an-
nounced that thirty-three defendants had been charged with carrying out a 
complex insurance fraud scheme (over the three-year investigation, a total of 
ninety-two defendants have been charged in this insurance fraud ring).4 Those 
defendants staged numerous automobile accidents, and through twenty-one 
complicit chiropractic clinics, the defendants billed insurers for unnecessary 
medical treatment and for treatment that was simply never provided.5 The in-
vestigation was nick named “Operation Sledgehammer” because investigators 
observed participants in the scheme using sledgehammers to further damage the 
vehicles in the staged accidents in efforts to maximize ill-gotten insurance pay-
outs.6 
B.   The Miller Ring 
One of the most, if not the most, infamous staged-accident rings operated 
in Southern California in the 1990s. Had one staged accident not gone awry, 
that ring might still be operating today. This is the ring (“the Miller Ring”) that 
will be referenced throughout this Article. A 1997 opinion from the California 
Court of Appeal provides a detailed description of the ring and the accident that 
led to its downfall.7 
On June 17, 1992, in Los Angeles, California, a tractor trailer loaded with 
cars jackknifed on Interstate 5, causing the load of cars to fall over onto the 
back of a smaller vehicle traveling nearby.8 Luis Perez, a passenger in the rear 
seat of the smaller vehicle, was killed as a result.9 At first, it appeared that Pe-
rez was the victim of a tragic accident.10 Further investigation revealed that Pe-
rez inadvertently orchestrated his own demise.11 
Earlier that day, Perez offered his neighbor $300 to help stage an automo-
bile accident.12 The neighbor agreed and accompanied Perez to meet with sev-
eral other individuals, including Juan Carlos Amaya, who also joined the 
                                                        
4  Press Release, U.S. Att’y Office, S. Dist. Fla., Thirty-three Defendants Charged in Staged 
Automobile Accident Scheme (May 16, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/usao-sdfl/pr/thirty-th 
ree-defendants-charged-staged-automobile-accident-scheme [https://perma.cc/D2EE-J3JU]. 
5  Id. 
6  Paula Mcmahon, South Florida Insurance Fraud: Feds Charge 92 over $20 Million in 
Claims, HUFFINGTON POST (July 17, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/17/ 
south-florida-insurance-fraud_n_3289964.html [https://perma.cc/EJ9S-NTHQ]. 
7  People v. Shamis, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 388 (1997). 
8  Id. at 391. 
9  Id. 
10  See DORNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
11  Id. at 4. Initially, Perez was driving the car that was crushed; however, following a failed 
staging attempt that had left him shaken, Perez pulled over and traded positions with a pas-
senger in the back seat, where Perez thought he would be in a safer position. He was seated 
in that back seat when he was crushed to death. Id. 
12  Shamis, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 391. 
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scheme.13 Amaya drove one car with two passengers, while Perez rode in a 
separate car with three other individuals.14 Amaya drove ahead of the tractor-
trailer.15 After the individual driving the car containing Perez maneuvered be-
tween the tractor-trailer and Amaya’s car, Amaya intentionally stepped on his 
brakes, giving the driver of Perez’s vehicle an excuse to brake.16 The tractor-
trailer then jackknifed, ultimately resulting in the tractor-trailer’s load of cars 
crushing Perez to death; the scheme ended in tragedy instead of with the ex-
pected insurance payout.17 
Had Perez survived, the scheme would have likely succeeded, with insur-
ance and law-enforcement investigators concluding that the driver of the big-rig 
was following too closely behind Perez’s vehicle. Perez’s death, however, led 
to a rare and entirely unanticipated investigative outcome—it led investigators 
to the scheme’s orchestrators.18 
According to the case documents,19 Elena Shamis was the office adminis-
trator for Los Angeles personal injury attorney Gary Paul Miller.20 In 1989 or 
1990, Shamis met a man named Filemon Santiago, who offered to refer auto-
mobile accidents to Miller’s office.21 Shamis agreed to pay Santiago approxi-
mately four to five thousand dollars per accident he referred.22 During a subse-
                                                        
13  Id. 
14  Id. 
15  Id. 
16  Id. 
17  Id. 
18  DORNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 2 (“At the coroner’s office, investigators from the California 
Highway Patrol (CHP) found a business card for a local personal injury law firm in Perez’s 
pockets. The card was colored money-green with a red bulls-eye beneath the acronym 
A.I.M.—Aid to Injured Motorists. At the center of the bulls-eye was a cartoonish rendering 
of a wrecked car with a body lying along side. Designed to look like a credit card, the solici-
tation came with a letter indicating that the cardholder had an ‘account’ with a certain attor-
ney whose name and toll-free 1-800 number were printed on the back. Also recovered from 
Perez’s wallet was a business card from a different law firm listing the name of an office 
administrator who had been arrested a few months earlier on charges of trading in fake acci-
dent cases.”). 
19  All references to Shamis relate to Shamis’s mere alleged—as opposed to actual—
involvement because Shamis was ultimately acquitted of all criminal charges against her. 
See CRIMINAL CASE SUMMARY, ELENA SHAMIS, CASE NO. XCNBA116066-02, SUPERIOR 
COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES (disposition date Mar. 2, 1999) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter ELENA SHAMIS, CASE NO. XCNBA116066-02]. Nevertheless, be-
cause Shamis was the named party in the opinion detailing the Miller Ring, her alleged in-
volvement is detailed herein. Shamis, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 388. As explained in greater detail 
below, former attorney Gary Paul Miller and the others mentioned herein were not as fortu-
nate as Shamis. E.g., CRIMINAL CASE SUMMARY, JUAN CARLOS AMAYA, CASE NO. 
XCNBA116066-01, SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES (disposition 
date Aug. 10, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter JUAN CARLOS AMAYA, CASE NO. 
XCNBA116066-01]. 
20  Shamis, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 389. 
21  Id. 
22  Id. 
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quent meeting, Santiago told Shamis that he would need money to buy insur-
ance for the accident participants.23 On an average week, Santiago referred 
three to four accidents—the majority of which were staged—to Miller’s of-
fice.24 Later, Shamis and Miller told Santiago to refer more cases involving ac-
cidents that occurred on the freeway.25 Santiago arranged a number of such ac-
cidents, including the one resulting in Perez’s death.26 The day after Perez’s 
death, Miller advised Santiago to leave the country.27 
Fast-forward to 1996 when California Department of Insurance investiga-
tor Shawn Ferris, tasked with investigating staged accidents, interviewed a man 
named Randy Harris.28 Harris informed Ferris that, from the late 1980s to 1992, 
he staged automobile accidents and then referred them to Miller’s office.29 In 
late 1991 or 1992, Harris, Santiago, Shamis, and Miller met at Miller’s office.30 
At that meeting, it was determined that Harris and Santiago should work to-
gether when staging accidents because, when they worked separately, their ac-
cidents involved “all Hispanics or all Blacks,” a fact that often raised suspi-
cions with the insurance companies.31 
 Ultimately, Shamis was acquitted on all charges filed against her.32 A 
number of other individuals, however, were convicted of crimes in relation to 
their roles in the ring. Notably, Amaya pled guilty to several crimes, including 
vehicular manslaughter.33 Santiago pled guilty to insurance fraud and man-
slaughter charges.34 Miller was convicted of a number of charges, including in-
voluntary manslaughter, and was sentenced to serve six years in prison.35 In 
1999, facing disciplinary action from the State Bar of California, Miller volun-
tarily resigned from the practice of law, bringing his twenty-one-plus-year legal 
career to an embarrassing end.36 
 These facts reveal multiple participants staging numerous accidents over a 
period of several years. Such scenarios raise the complex issues discussed be-
                                                        
23  Id. at 390. 
24  Id. 
25  Id. 
26  Id. at 390–91. 
27  Id. at 391. 
28  Id. 
29  Id. 
30  Id. 
31  Id. at 391–92. 
32  ELENA SHAMIS, CASE NO. XCNBA116066-02, supra note 19. 
33  JUAN CARLOS AMAYA, CASE NO. XCNBA116066-01, supra note 19. 
34  DORNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 447 n.6. 
35  Attorney Facing Charges in Death of Accident Stager Resigns, CAL. BAR J., July 1999, 
http://archive.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/2cbj/99jul/page27-1.htm [https://perma.cc/6NZD-TEY9]. 
Miller was initially charged with second-degree murder; pursuant to plea negotiations, that 
charge was reduced to involuntary manslaughter. Id. 
36  Id. 
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low that prosecutors must consider when charging crimes stemming from those 
staged accidents. 
II.   SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL OFFENSES STEMMING FROM STAGED-ACCIDENT 
INSURANCE SCHEMES 
For the purposes of this Article, reference to “substantive offenses” denotes 
crimes that can be the underlying objectives of traditional conspiracies and/or 
racketeering conspiracy, i.e., crimes that can be the underlying objectives of 
such conspiracies. In the context of staged-accident insurance fraud, such 
crimes may include, among others, insurance fraud, theft, obtaining money by 
false pretenses, battery with a deadly weapon, and on rare occasions, murder. 
Because the objective of staged-accident insurance-fraud rings is defrauding 
insurers for insurance payouts, it is apparent how a ring’s participants could be 
charged with insurance fraud,37 theft,38 and/or obtaining money by false pre-
                                                        
37  Nevada Revised Statute § 686A.2815(1)(a)–(h) (2015) provides: 
1. “Insurance fraud” means knowingly and willfully: 
a. Presenting or causing to be presented any statement to an insurer, a reinsurer, a producer, a 
broker or any agent thereof, if the person who presents or causes the presentation of the state-
ment knows that the statement conceals or omits facts, or contains false or misleading infor-
mation concerning any fact material to an application for the issuance of a policy of insurance. 
b. Presenting or causing to be presented any statement as a part of, or in support of, a claim for 
payment or other benefits under a policy of insurance, if the person who presents or causes the 
presentation of the statement knows that the statement conceals or omits facts, or contains false 
or misleading information concerning any fact material to that claim. 
c. Assisting, abetting, soliciting or conspiring with another person to present or cause to be pre-
sented any statement to an insurer, a reinsurer, a producer, a broker or any agent thereof, if the 
person who assists, abets, solicits or conspires knows that the statement conceals or omits facts, 
or contains false or misleading information concerning any fact material to an application for the 
issuance of a policy of insurance or a claim for payment or other benefits under such a policy. 
d. Acting or failing to act with the intent of defrauding or deceiving an insurer, a reinsurer, a 
producer, a broker or any agent thereof, to obtain a policy of insurance or any proceeds or other 
benefits under such a policy. 
e. As a practitioner, an insurer or any agent thereof, acting to assist, conspire with or urge anoth-
er person to commit any act or omission specified in this section through deceit, misrepresenta-
tion or other fraudulent means. 
f. Accepting any proceeds or other benefits under a policy of insurance, if the person who ac-
cepts the proceeds or other benefits knows that the proceeds or other benefits are derived from 
any act or omission specified in this section. 
g. Employing a person to procure clients, patients or other persons who obtain services or bene-
fits under a policy of insurance for the purpose of engaging in any act or omission specified in 
this section, except that such insurance fraud does not include contact or communication by an 
insurer or an agent or representative of the insurer with a client, patient or other person if the 
contact or communication is made for a lawful purpose, including, without limitation, communi-
cation by an insurer with a holder of a policy of insurance issued by the insurer or with a claim-
ant concerning the settlement of any claims against the policy. 
h. Participating in, aiding, abetting, conspiring to commit, soliciting another person to commit, 
or permitting an employee or agent to commit any act or omission specified in this section. 
38  “[A] person commits theft if, without lawful authority, the person knowingly: . . . 
[o]btains real, personal or intangible property or the services of another person by a material 
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tenses.39 The charges of battery with a deadly weapon and murder, however, 
warrant further discussion. 
“ ‘Battery’ means any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon 
the person of another.”40 If a battery is committed with the use of a deadly 
weapon, the treatment of such an offense is elevated from a misdemeanor to a 
felony.41 “A deadly weapon is ‘[a]ny weapon, device, instrument, material or 
substance which, under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be 
used or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing substantial bodily 
harm or death.’ ”42 
While the Nevada Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue, in 
Bustamante v. Evans (an unpublished opinion), the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that, under California law, one who uses his or her vehicle to inten-
tionally strike the vehicle of another (presumably, with one or more persons in 
the vehicle of another) uses his or her vehicle as a deadly weapon.43 The Neva-
da Supreme Court, in an unpublished opinion of its own, approvingly cited 
Bustamante in support of its conclusion that a vehicle used to directly strike the 
person of another constitutes a deadly weapon.44 While these opinions are not 
controlling authority, they are persuasive. 
Given those opinions, as well as the inherent dangers presented by vehicles 
operated by unpredictable drivers, it is logical to conclude that the Nevada Su-
preme Court will ultimately hold that a vehicle used to intentionally strike an-
other vehicle containing one or more individuals constitutes a deadly weapon. 
Should the Nevada Supreme Court require additional evidence that a vehicle 
used to stage an accident was used as a deadly weapon, such evidence will of-
ten be readily available. For example, staged-accident rings often stage acci-
dents on freeways, where vehicles typically travel at higher speeds, thus in-
creasing the risk of death. This is done in an effort to avoid surveillance 
cameras and maximize damage to the vehicle (thus maximizing any insurance 
payout). Additionally, law enforcement may discover evidence that the partici-
pants knew of the high risk of their behavior: for example, old tires or sandbags 
stuffed in the trunk of the vehicle that was rear ended in order to cushion the 
blow of the accident.45 Further, staged-accident rings often target commercial 
vehicles because they are generally insured with high policy limits; such vehi-
                                                                                                                                 
misrepresentation with intent to deprive that person of the property or services.” NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 205.0832(1)(c) (2015). 
39  “A person who knowingly and designedly by any false pretense obtains from any other 
person any . . . money . . . or other valuable thing . . . with the intent to cheat or defraud the 
other person” commits the crime of obtaining money by false pretenses. Id. § 205.380(1). 
40  Id. § 200.481(1)(a). 
41  Id. § 200.481(2)(a), (e). 
42  Gray v. State, No. 61987, 2014 WL 4922871, at *1 (Nev. Sept. 29, 2014) (quoting NEV. 
REV. STAT § 193.165(6)(b)). 
43  Bustamante v. Evans, 140 F. App’x 655, 656 (9th Cir. 2005). 
44  Gray, 2014 WL 4922871, at *2. 
45  DORNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 8. 
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cles are often larger than noncommercial vehicles and pose a greater risk to 
those involved in, or in the vicinity of, the accident.46 
This same evidence of risk supports a charge of murder, should someone 
die in a staged accident. Nevada law defines murder as “the unlawful killing of 
a human being: [] [w]ith malice aforethought, either express or implied . . . .”47 
“Express malice is that deliberate intention . . . to take away the life of a fellow 
creature . . . manifested by external circumstances capable of proof.”48 Malice 
is implied “when no considerable provocation appears, or when all the circum-
stances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.”49 
First-degree murder includes the killing of another in circumstances not 
applicable to deaths caused by staged-accident rings.50 Second-degree murder 
includes all other murders.51 As explained below, those staging accidents run 
the risk of a second-degree murder conviction, should someone die as a result 
of any such accident. 
“Malice aforethought may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly 
weapon in a deadly and dangerous manner.”52 “Malice can be present in the ab-
sence of an express intent to kill and ‘as applied to murder does not necessarily 
import ill will toward the victim, but signifies general malignant recklessness of 
others’ lives and safety or disregard of social duty.”53 A jury could reasonably 
find that those who stage automobile accidents display a recklessness or disre-
gard of a social duty. 
A California Court of Appeal has ruled that implied malice that supports 
second degree murder charges could be found in a case where the defendants 
killed three people while engaging in an illegal street race.54 To support that 
finding, the court noted: (1) the defendants’ knowledge of the residential nature 
of the neighborhood where the accident took place; (2) the excessive speeds at 
which the defendants had been driving—fifty to sixty miles per hour over the 
speed limit; (3) the defendants’ knowledge of the four-way stop sign they had 
run just prior to the accident; (4) reckless driving of one of the defendants on 
two prior occasions on the day of the accident; (5) the modifications made to 
the defendants’ vehicles in order to provide them with more power and speed; 
                                                        
46  Id. at 298 (“[O]nly in Los Angeles could [staged accidents] become so common that a 
regular notice in the local automobile club and in insurance magazines offered checklists of 
‘staged accident warning signs’ (car in front slams on brakes; older car; more than two pas-
sengers); and warnings on ‘who’s likely to be a target’ (women, older people, commercial 
vehicles) . . . .”). 
47  NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.010(1) (2015). 
48  Id. § 200.020(1). 
49  Id. § 200.020(2). 
50  Id. § 200.030(1). 
51  Id. § 200.030(2). 
52  Moser v. State, 544 P.2d 424, 426 (Nev. 1975). 
53  Keys v. State, 766 P.2d 270, 271 (Nev. 1988) (quoting Thedford v. Sheriff, 476 P.2d 25, 
27 (Nev. 1970)). 
54  See generally People v. Canizalez, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 565 (2011). 
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and (6) the defendants’ complete disregard for the lives of the victims immedi-
ately after the accident took place.55 
The California Court of Appeal’s sound analysis notes several factors that 
can be used to support second-degree murder charges when a vehicle is used in 
a reckless manner. Some of those same factors (e.g., the defendants’ rate of 
speed, the defendants’ prior conduct, and the defendants’ conduct following the 
accident) can be used to justify a second-degree murder charge for a death re-
sulting from a staged-accident. As explained in the above discussion relating to 
the battery with a deadly weapon charge, staged-accident investigations often 
reveal evidence of the participants’ general malignant recklessness toward oth-
ers’ lives and safety or disregard of social duty.56 
Any such criminal culpability is not limited to the driver(s) of the car(s) 
used to stage the accident. All principals are criminally culpable for the crimes 
stemming from staged accidents.57 Nevada law defines the term “principals” as 
follows: 
                                                        
55  Id. at 575–77. The defendants made no effort to assist the woman and two children who 
burned to death in their vehicle. Id. at 576. Additionally, defendant Canizalez’s actions fol-
lowing the accident were described as follows: 
Canizalez was heard saying, “[L]ook at his car. [I] crashed [my] car. [My] car is fucked up,” 
and, “I don’t give a fuck about those kids. I give a fuck—look at my car. I don’t give a fuck 
about those kids.” 
Id. 
56  In his book Accidentally, on Purpose: The Making of a Personal Injury Underworld in 
America, author Ken Dornstein explains: “The squat cars are often stuffed with anyone who 
happens to be around at the time of the planning; squat passengers either do not mind or are 
not fully aware of the danger.” DORNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 3. This fact can best be illustrat-
ed by Dornstein’s description of events preceding Perez’s death: 
[Santiago’s] crashes did not always go as planned. In the Perez staging alone, [Santiago’s] 
recruits had attempted three times to get the Pontiac rear-ended by a truck. On the first attempt, 
José Perez himself had been the driver of the Pontiac. On the second attempt, the targeted truck 
managed to skid to a stop before making contact. Ruben Garcia, a backseat passenger in that at-
tempt, was so shaken by the experience that he swore off staged accidents for good. Angel Her-
nandez had also been a backseat passenger on the second attempt; he later claimed that he had 
no idea that the crash was going to involve trucks on the freeway until he actually got on the 
road. Juan Carlos Amaya, suspected of being a swoop-car driver for Santiago, had been respon-
sible for picking out the truck, then for giving the squat car a reason to stop short by cutting it off 
and exiting the freeway before the police arrived. Amaya, in his lower-risk job, was apparently 
undeterred by the failures and went back out on the freeway each time to try again. José Perez 
was troubled by the previous failed staging attempts, however. Just after the cars entered the 
freeway, he pulled to the shoulder and asked one of his passengers, Jorge Sanchez, to take the 
wheel. Perez moved to the relative safety of the backseat, where, he thought, he was less likely 
to be impaled on the steering wheel or to fly through the windshield on impact. Rubidia Lopez 
sat next to Perez. Eyeing the car carrier through the back windshield minutes before the colli-
sion, the twenty-four-year-old woman asked nervously: “Can’t someone get killed doing this?” 
José Perez did not respond, Lopez later recalled, except to indicate a half-hearted agreement 
with [Santiago’s] earlier assurances of safety. 
Id. at 4. 
57  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 195.020 (2015). 
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Every person concerned in the commission of a felony, gross misdemeanor or 
misdemeanor, whether the person directly commits the act constituting the of-
fense, or aids or abets in its commission, and whether present or absent; and eve-
ry person who, directly or indirectly, counsels, encourages, hires, commands, 
induces or otherwise procures another to commit a felony, gross misdemeanor or 
misdemeanor is a principal, and shall be proceeded against and punished as 
such. The fact that the person aided, abetted, counseled, encouraged, hired, 
commanded, induced or procured, could not or did not entertain a criminal intent 
shall not be a defense to any person aiding, abetting, counseling, encouraging, 
hiring, commanding, inducing or procuring him or her.58 
“[I]n order for a person to be held accountable for the specific intent crime 
of another under an aiding or abetting theory of principal liability, the aider or 
abettor must have knowingly aided the other person with the intent that the oth-
er person commit the charged crime.”59 Battery with a deadly weapon and se-
cond-degree murder are general-intent crimes, while insurance fraud, theft by 
material misrepresentation, and obtaining money by false pretenses are specif-
ic-intent crimes.60 
 Thus, the staged-accident participants will be criminally culpable for the 
crimes they directly perpetrated, as well as those they aided and abetted, so 
long as they possessed the requisite mens rea when aiding and abetting the 
commission of those crimes. Additionally, members of staged-accident rings 
may be held vicariously liable for the conduct of their coconspirators.61 Deter-
mining whom to charge in a case involving a single staged accident poses few 
challenges; charging decisions become challenging in cases where multiple ac-
cidents are staged by numerous participants, some of whom do not participate 
in all of the staged accidents. 
III.   CHARGING ISSUES THAT ARISE IN THE PROSECUTION OF STAGED-
ACCIDENT INSURANCE FRAUD CASES 
Staged-accident rings often stage numerous accidents before they are 
caught.62 The prosecution of such rings commonly raises the question of 
whether a single charging document can be used to charge all of the ring’s par-
ticipants for all of their criminal conduct, or whether multiple cases should be 
prosecuted in order to charge the participants for separate and distinct criminal 
acts stemming from each individual accident. This Article focuses on the pros-
ecution’s ability to charge, in a single case, members of a staged-accident ring 
for all of crimes committed by the ring. 
                                                        
58  Id. § 195.020. 
59  Sharma v. State, 56 P.3d 868, 872 (Nev. 2002). 
60  See infra Part III.C. 
61  See infra Part III.D. 
62  See, e.g., People v. Shamis, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 388 (1997). 
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A.   Joinder of Charges 
 The Miller Ring was not caught until the June 17, 1992, accident resulted 
in the death of one of its participants.63 For about two years prior to that fateful 
accident, the Miller Ring staged several additional accidents that resulted in 
fraudulent insurance payouts.64 In such matters, prosecutors are faced with de-
ciding whether they can charge in a single criminal case the crimes committed 
in relation to each of those accidents.65 For example, imagine that prosecutors 
had evidence that suspects Miller, Santiago, Amaya, and others, staged acci-
dents, including a fatal accident, in Nevada on the following dates: 
•   June 1, 1991 
•   September 20, 1991 
•   December 31, 1991 
•   March 15, 1992 
•   June 17, 1992  
Assume all of these staged accidents were carried out in a similar man-
ner—in what is known as a “Swoop and Squat” by law enforcement and by the 
insurance industry—described as follows.66 
                                                        
63  Id. at 391. 
64  Id. at 389–90. 
65  It is important to remember that, “even if charges could otherwise be properly joined, sev-
erance may still be mandated where joinder would result in unfair prejudice to the defend-
ant.” Weber v. State, 119 P.3d 107, 121 (Nev. 2005). 
66  In addition to the “Swoop and Squat,” the National Insurance Crime Bureau (“NICB”), a 
nonprofit organization that partners with insurers and law enforcement agencies to facilitate 
the identification, detection and prosecution of insurance criminals, identifies three addition-
al, commonly-used accident schemes: (1) the “Side Swipe”; (2) the “Panic Stop”; and (3) the 
“Drive Down.” NAT’L INS. CRIME BUREAU, STAGED AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT FRAUD: THAT 
WAS NO ACCIDENT, https://www.nicb.org/theft_and_fraud_awareness/brochures [https://per 
ma.cc/KG58-P2J2] (select “Staged Automobile Accident Fraud” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 
8, 2017). The NICB describes those schemes as follows: 
Side Swipe 
This caused accident scheme typically occurs at busy intersections with dual left turn lanes. 
The criminal positions his vehicle in the outer lane. As soon as the victim’s vehicle drifts into 
the outer turn lane, the criminal side swipes it. To help ensure the scheme’s success, the criminal 
conducts advance surveillance to identify heavily traveled intersections with a high volume of 
newer vehicles, and ones where vehicles in the inner turn lane oftentimes drift across lane divid-
er lines into the outer left turn lane. 
Panic Stop 
In this scheme, the criminal typically drives an older vehicle filled with passengers. The 
criminal positions his car in front of the victim’s while a backseat passenger in the criminal’s 
vehicle watches and waits for the innocent motorist to be distracted, such as by a cell phone call. 
Sometimes criminals will intentionally damage their brake light bulbs so that they do not func-
tion, thus providing no warning to the victim that the scheme is about to occur. Once the victim 
is distracted, the backseat passenger tells the driver to slam on the brakes, thus causing the inno-
cent motorist to rear end the criminal’s vehicle. Even though the victim suspects that the crimi-
nal’s vehicle “suddenly stopped for no apparent reason,” the victim’s insurance company must 
pay for the vehicle damages as well as the injuries that passengers claim to suffer from the acci-
dent. 
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 The defendants use two of their own vehicles or vehicles of other ring par-
ticipants to stage the accident: the swoop vehicle and the swat vehicle. The 
drivers of the swoop and squat vehicles find a victim to target—often a com-
mercial vehicle that is likely to be insured with high policy limits.67 Amaya, 
driving the swoop vehicle, speeds up to get ahead of the victim’s vehicle while 
the driver of the squat vehicle speeds ahead of the victim to position the squat 
vehicle between the swoop vehicle and the victim’s vehicle. Amaya then brakes 
abruptly, which gives the driver of the squat vehicle an excuse to brake, caus-
ing the victim to rear-end the squat vehicle.68 Finally, Amaya quickly drives off 
in the swoop vehicle. 
The ring participants who were in the squat vehicle now claim to have suf-
fered injuries as a result of being rear-ended. Police, who often lack the training 
needed to spot signs that the accident was staged, generally cite the victim for 
following too closely behind the squat vehicle. The ring participants then col-
lect insurance payouts for the accident they intentionally caused. Santiago is the 
“capper,” the individual who organizes the participants and plans the accident 
before referring the resulting personal injury case to Miller. Miller is the attor-
ney who encourages the commission of the offenses and then demands pay-
ment from the victims’ insurers. 
 An analysis of the issue—whether those three particular defendants, Miller, 
Santiago, and Amaya, can be charged for crimes stemming from each of those 
staged accidents (insurance fraud, theft, obtaining money by false pretenses, 
battery with a deadly weapon, and murder)—begins with a review of Nevada’s 
statutory law regarding joinder of offenses. For the sole purpose of analyzing 
Nevada’s laws regarding joinder, let us first address the issue without regard to 
                                                                                                                                 
Drive Down 
In the drive down scheme, the victim merges his vehicle into traffic after being motioned in 
by the criminal. As the innocent driver begins to merge, the criminal speeds up and causes a col-
lision. When questioned, the criminal denies motioning the victim to merge into traffic or gives 
an excuse, such as “I was swatting a fly.” This type of caused accident scheme works well where 
vehicles have to merge, such as at four-way stop signs, t-intersections, merge and yield signs, 
lane reductions and closures, freeway ramps, and parking lots. 
The left turn drive down is a new spin on this scheme. Criminals target innocent motorists 
who are often trying to complete a left turn into a strip mall or other parking structure. The crim-
inal enlists an accomplice such as another car, a pedestrian or even a security guard to block the 
innocent motorist’s path. The criminal then quickly drives up and causes the accident, the inno-
cent motorist is still at fault because a car making a left turn is almost always liable to a car com-
ing straight in the other direction. 
Id. 
67  Id. (“Fraudulent automobile accidents occur more frequently in urban areas where there is 
a greater volume of vehicles and in wealthier communities because drivers there are per-
ceived to have better insurance coverage. Criminals oftentimes target new, rental or com-
mercial vehicles because they are typically well-insured.”). 
68  Id. At times, the rings utilize one or more additional vehicles for the purpose of boxing in 
the victim and preventing him or her from avoiding the accident. 
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the effect that the addition of a conspiracy or racketeering charge may have on 
the discussion.69 
NRS 173.115 provides: 
Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in 
a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or 
misdemeanors or both, are: 
1. Based on the same act or transaction; or 
2. Based on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting 
parts of a common scheme or plan.70 
A thorough analysis of NRS 173.115(2) is set forth in Weber v. State.71 It is 
important to remember that “even if charges can otherwise be properly joined, 
severance may still be mandated where joinder would result in unfair prejudice 
to the defendant.”72 
 Under NRS 173.115(2), crimes are “connected together” when “evidence 
of either crime would be admissible in a separate trial regarding the other 
crime.”73 NRS 48.045 provides for the admission of “other acts” evidence, and 
NRS 48.045 provides for the admission of res gestae evidence.74 
 In the hypothetical involving the Miller Ring, it can reasonably be argued 
that crimes stemming from each of the accidents were “connected together” for 
the purposes of NRS 173.115(2); if each accident was charged in separate cas-
es, under NRS 48.045, evidence of all of the accidents would be admissible in 
the trials for each of those separate cases. 
 NRS 48.045(2) states that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts . . . 
may . . . be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, 
                                                        
69  See infra Part III.C–D (discussing the effect of conspiracy and racketeering charges is dis-
cussed in detail). 
70  NEV. REV. STAT. § 173.115 (2015). 
71  Weber v. State, 119 P.3d 107 (Nev. 2005). 
72  See id. at 121. 
73  Id. at 120. 
74  Id. at 121. “Evidence which is probative of the crime charged and does not solely concern 
uncharged crimes is not ‘other crimes’ evidence.” United States v. DeClue, 899 F.2d 1465, 
1472 (6th Cir. 1990). General hornbook law explains the principal of res gestae as follows: 
In criminal cases, all facts tending to exhibit the res gestae, or to establish a chain of circumstan-
tial evidence with respect of the act charged, are admissible. It is necessary only that they tend to 
prove the issue or constitute a link in the chain of evidence. On the other hand, circumstantial 
evidence may be irrelevant because a link in the chain of facts is missing, which is required to 
give probative value to the evidence. 
29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 317 (2016) (footnotes and citations omitted). The Nevada Su-
preme Court has narrowly construed this principal, stating that “admission of evidence under 
NRS 48.035(3) is limited to the statute’s express provisions.” Bellon v. State, 117 P.3d 176, 
181 (Nev. 2005). Nevada’s res gestae law is codified in NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.035(3) (2015), 
which provides: 
Evidence of another act or crime which is so closely related to an act in controversy or a crime 
charged that an ordinary witness cannot describe the act in controversy or the crime charged 
without referring to the other act or crime shall not be excluded, but at the request of an interest-
ed party, a cautionary instruction shall be given explaining the reason for its admission. 
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intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or acci-
dent.”75 In the context of staged-accident cases, evidence of other staged acci-
dents can be used for a number of purposes. Clearly, evidence of the other 
staged accidents can be used to establish motive, i.e., obtaining insurance pay-
outs. The evidence could also be used to establish a common plan, given the 
fact that each accident was staged in a similar manner, with some of the same 
participants carrying out the same roles for the ring. Further, the evidence of 
the other staged accidents can be used to negate the defense’s likely argument 
that the crash was truly an accident. Finally, because NRS 48.045(2)’s list of 
uses is not inclusive, the other accidents can be used to support an expert wit-
ness’s opinion that the accident at issue was staged.76 
 Even if a court ruled that the crimes stemming from the staged accidents 
were not “connected together” for the purposes of NRS 173.115(2), the prose-
cution would likely be able to establish that they were part of a “common 
scheme or plan.” 
 A fact-specific analysis must be used to determine whether a common 
scheme or plan existed.77 Using Black’s Law Dictionary definitions of the 
terms “scheme” and “plan,” the Nevada Supreme Court has explained: 
[P]urposeful design is central to a scheme or plan, though this does not mean 
that every scheme or plan must exhibit rigid consistency or coherency. We rec-
ognize that a person who forms and follows a scheme or plan may have to con-
tend with contingencies, and therefore a scheme or plan can in practice reflect 
some flexibility and variation but still fall within an overall intended design.78 
The Nevada Supreme Court has shown a willingness to join charges even 
when the crimes upon which the charges are based occurred many months apart 
from one another. In Middleton v. State, the defendant was convicted on nu-
merous charges for the kidnapping and murder of Katherine Powell in February 
of 1995 and Thelma Davila in August of 1994.79 On appeal, the defendant chal-
lenged, among other things, the trial court’s denial of his request to “sever the 
counts relating to Davila from the counts relating to Powell.”80 The Nevada Su-
preme Court upheld the trial court’s ruling, noting numerous similarities be-
tween the crimes: 
                                                        
75  NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.045(2) (2015). 
In order to overcome the presumption of the inadmissibility, the prosecution must request a hear-
ing and establish that: (1) the prior bad act is relevant to the crime charged and for a purpose 
other than proving the defendant’s propensity, (2) the act is proven by clear and convincing evi-
dence, and (3) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice. 
Bigpond v. State, 270 P.3d 1244, 1250 (Nev. 2012). 
76  See Bradley v. State, 864 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Nev. 1993) (permitting admission of evidence 
of prior acts for the purpose of explaining an expert witness’s testimony). 
77  Weber v. State, 119 P.3d 107, 119 (Nev. 2005). 
78  Id. at 120 (footnote omitted). 
79  Middleton v. State, 968 P.2d 296, 300–03 (Nev. 1998). 
80  Id. at 308. 
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[B]oth victims were unmarried females of similar age (one was forty-two and 
the other forty-five); both were alone at home when they disappeared; both 
homes had been serviced by Middleton’s employer, TCI Cable; Middleton had 
met both victims before their disappearance (the evidence that Middleton met 
Davila is not conclusive, but strong); neither victim’s home showed evidence of 
a forced entry; Middleton went to his storage unit on the day that each victim 
disappeared; his storage unit yielded DNA evidence from each of the victims 
and property belonging to each; and the remains of each victim were found 
dumped in remote or concealed locations, wrapped in plastic garbage bags and 
bound with rope similar to rope found in Middleton’s storage unit.81 
 As was the case in Middleton, there are numerous similarities between the 
crimes stemming from the accidents described in the Miller Ring hypothet-
ical—from the involvement of common participants (i.e., Miller, Santiago, and 
Amaya), to the characteristics of the victims (i.e., drivers of commercial vehi-
cles), to the manner in which the accidents were staged (i.e., Swoop and 
Squats), to the ultimate purpose of the staging (i.e., the submission of fraudu-
lent insurance claims). Thus, NRS 173.115(2)’s common-scheme-or-plan 
clause is another proper basis for joinder of the crimes stemming from each of 
the staged accidents. 
B.   Joinder of Defendants 
 Clearly, Miller, Santiago, and Amaya were not the only participants in the 
staged accidents. These schemes require someone to drive the squat car, which 
is often filled with several passengers in order to maximize any insurance pay-
out realized down the road.82 Commonly, prosecutors are confronted with cases 
in which some of the ring’s participants were involved with only some of the 
accidents staged by the ring. The question becomes whether, in a single charg-
ing document filed in a single criminal case, all of the ring’s participants can be 
charged for their crimes stemming from the ring’s overall scheme. Again, for 
the purpose of analyzing Nevada’s laws regarding joinder, set aside any 
thoughts as to the effect that the addition of a conspiracy or racketeering charge 
may have on the discussion.83 Nevada’s laws regarding joinder provide only 
limited assistance to a prosecutor who wishes to file a single criminal case to 
secure convictions against all of the ring’s participants. 
 For the purposes of examining issues relating to joinder of defendants, let 
us take the Miller Ring hypothetical a step further and identify the (hypothet-
ical) additional members of the ring that participated in each accident, as well 
as the roles of those additional members. This will help illustrate how the lim-
                                                        
81  Id. at 308–09. 
82  DORNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 3 (“The drivers and passengers of the cars take to the roads 
looking to trap another car (or a truck) into rear-ending the squat car so that the passengers 
can make personal injury claims against that other driver’s insurance company. . . . The 
squat cars are often stuffed with anyone who happens to be around at the time of the plan-
ning . . . .”). 
83  See infra Parts IIIC.–D. 
17 NEV.L.J. 459, KOVAC FINAL.DOCX 4/5/17  11:11 AM 
Spring 2017] STAGED-ACCIDENT INSURANCE SCHEMES 475 
ited scope of certain members’ roles affects the prosecution’s ability to charge 
those members in the same case as members who played more prominent roles 
in the ring’s activities: 
•   June 1, 1991 (Joe Smith – driver of the squat car) 
•   September 20, 1991 (Mary Jones – passenger in the squat car) 
•   December 31, 1991 (Joe Smith – passenger in the squat car) 
•   March 15, 1992 (no known additional participants) 
•   June 17, 1992 (no known additional participants) 
Having established the participants’ (hypothetical) roles, we now turn to 
the pertinent law affecting joinder of Smith and Jones. 
 The United State Supreme Court has acknowledged that “[j]oint trials ‘play 
a vital role in the criminal justice system.’ ”84 “They promote efficiency and 
‘serve the interests of justice by avoiding the scandal and inequity of incon-
sistent verdicts.’ ”85 
 NRS 173.135 provides: 
Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information 
if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the 
same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such de-
fendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of 
the defendants need not be charged in each count.86 
 While “defendants are not entitled to severance merely because they may 
have a better chance of acquittal in separate trials,”87 the prosecution’s ability to 
try multiple defendants in a joint trial is not absolute. A determination regard-
ing the propriety of jointly trying multiple defendants often turns on one ques-
tion: can the jury “reasonably be expected to compartmentalize the evidence as 
it relates to separate defendants”?88 The prosecution must ensure that “evidence 
against one defendant [was] not disproportionate in regard to another, thereby 
creating the potential for an unfair ‘overlapping’ effect.”89 In other words, even 
if joinder would be permissible under the plain language of NRS 173.135, 
courts will consider whether application of that plain language would be fair to 
the defendant being joined. 
                                                        
84  Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993) (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 
200, 209 (1987)). 
85  Id. (quoting Richardson, 481 U.S. at 210); see Jones v. State, 899 P.2d 544, 547 (Nev. 
1995) (noting the public interest in joint trials of persons charged together). 
86   NEV. REV. STAT. § 173.135 (2015). 
87  Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540. 
88  Jones, 899 P.2d at 547. 
89  Amen v. State, 801 P.2d 1354, 1358 (Nev. 1990); see Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539 (“When 
many defendants are tried together in a complex case and they have markedly different de-
grees of culpability, th[e] risk of prejudice is heightened.”). 
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 Additionally, severance is proper if “there is a serious risk that a joint trial 
would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants”90—the right 
to confront and cross-examine witnesses, for example. Further, severance is 
proper when inconsistent defenses asserted by codefendants are “antagonistic 
to the point that they are mutually exclusive.”91 Again, the plain language of 
NRS 173.135 is not controlling; joinder must also be fair and not negate the 
rights of the accused. 
 Given these court-created exceptions to NRS 173.135, it is difficult to an-
swer the question of whether, in our hypothetical, the prosecution could charge 
all of the known participants for their respective crimes in the same charging 
document. Clearly, Mary Jones and Joe Smith played lesser roles compared to 
the other ring members noted. While a jury may reasonably be expected to be 
able to compartmentalize the evidence against Mary Jones and/or Joe Smith,92 a 
more fact-specific analysis is required to determine whether a joint trial may 
compromise their individual rights (e.g., the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses). For example, had one of the ringleaders made a statement 
to an officer who responded to the staged accident that implicated Mary Jones, 
then Mary Jones’s attorney may wish to cross-examine that ringleader about 
that statement; however, if that ringleader and Mary Jones are charged in the 
same case, her attorney could never call that ringleader to the stand (assuming 
the ringleader would invoke his right to remain silent). Moreover, it will be a 
matter of judicial discretion to determine whether Jones or Smith are at a 
heightened risk of prejudice as a result of existence of disproportionate evi-
dence against the other ring members. In short, the propriety of joining defend-
ants is a matter of judicial discretion requiring a fact-specific analysis. There is 
no hard and fast rule; determinations will be made on a case-by-case basis. 
C.   Traditional Conspiracy 
 As previously noted, the discussion regarding joinder intentionally did not 
include a discussion of the effect conspiracy and/or racketeering charges have 
on charging issues. Let us now turn to the effect of adding the charge of con-
spiracy, while temporarily setting aside a discussion of the effect of any racket-
eering charge. 
 “Nevada law defines a conspiracy as ‘an agreement between two or more 
persons for an unlawful purpose.’ ”93 
                                                        
90  Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539. “Evidence that is probative of a defendant’s guilt but technically 
admissible only against a codefendant also might present a risk of prejudice.” Id. (citing Bru-
ton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)). 
91  Amen, 801 P.2d at 1359. 
92  See State v. Sheeley, 162 P.2d 96, 100 (Nev. 1945) (“It must be presumed by this court 
that the jury followed the evidence in the case, and the law given by the court.”). 
93  Bolden v. State, 124 P.3d 191, 194 (Nev. 2005) (quoting Doyle v. State, 921 P.2d 901, 
911 (Nev. 1996)). 
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A person who knowingly does any act to further the object of a conspiracy, or 
otherwise participates therein, is criminally liable as a conspirator; however, 
“[m]ere knowledge or approval of, or acquiescence in, the object and purpose of 
a conspiracy without an agreement to cooperate in achieving such object or pur-
pose does not make one a party to conspiracy.”94 
At the same time, “it shall not be necessary to prove that any overt act was 
done in pursuance of such unlawful conspiracy or combination.”95 
 Faced with far-flung, loosely associated criminal enterprises such as those 
that carry out staged-accident frauds, prosecutors often face two distinct ques-
tions: (1) Should the prosecutor charge the defendants with participating in (a) 
a single conspiracy that encompasses all of the acts of the staged-accident ring, 
or (b) multiple conspiracies, with each conspiracy charge encompassing a sepa-
rate and distinct agreement to stage an accident?; and (2) Under a traditional 
Nevada coconspirator vicarious-liability theory, to what extent is one cocon-
spirator responsible for the conduct of other coconspirators? 
1.   Single Conspiracy vs. Multiple Conspiracies 
 Kotteakos v. United States is the seminal United States Supreme Court case 
addressing the impropriety of charging a single conspiracy where the evidence 
admitted at trial, instead, establishes the existence of multiple conspiracies.96 
 Kotteakos involved a classic wheel, or hub-and-spoke, conspiracy.97 Essen-
tially, the government alleged that thirty-two individuals sought to defraud fi-
nancial institutions in violation of the National Housing Act.98 The defendants 
were part of eight or more groups (the spokes) who worked independently to 
defraud financial institutions.99 Although none of the groups had any connec-
tion with the others, all groups worked with defendant Simon Brown (the hub) 
in carrying out their fraudulent acts.100 
 The Court explained that, “[t]he proof therefore admittedly made out a 
case, not of a single conspiracy, but of several, notwithstanding only one was 
charged in the indictment.”101 The Court went on to state that the prosecution 
could not “string together, for common trial, eight or more separate and distinct 
crimes, conspiracies related in kind though they might be, when the only nexus 
                                                        
94  Doyle, 921 P.2d at 911 (citation omitted). 
95  NEV. REV. STAT. § 199.490 (2015). 
96  Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946). 
97  See id. at 750–56. A “wheel conspiracy” is “[a] conspiracy in which a single member or 
group (the ‘hub’) separately agrees with two or more other members or groups (the 
‘spokes’). The person or group at the hub is the only party liable for all the conspiracies. [] 
Also termed . . . circle conspiracy; hub-and-spoke conspiracy.” Wheel Conspiracy, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
98  Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 752. 
99  Id. at 754–55. 
100  Id. 
101  Id. at 755. 
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among them lies in the fact that one man participated in all.”102 The Court re-
versed the defendants’ convictions, explaining that it was “highly probable” 
that the error in charging and trying the separate and distinct conspiracies as 
though they were one conspiracy “had substantial and injurious effect or influ-
ence in determining the jury’s [guilty] verdict.”103 In other words, it was not 
fair to the defendants who participated in a single, smaller conspiracy to be cast 
to the jury as part of a much larger conspiracy in which they played only a mi-
nor role. 
 The year after it issued its opinion in Kotteakos, the Supreme Court clari-
fied that individuals who are not aware of one another’s activities can, never-
theless, be deemed participants in a single conspiracy: 
Secrecy and concealment are essential features of successful conspiracy. The 
more completely they are achieved, the more successful the crime. Hence the 
law rightly gives room for allowing the conviction of those discovered upon 
showing, sufficiently the essential nature of the plan and their connections with 
it, without requiring evidence of knowledge of all its details or of the participa-
tion of others.104 
Think, for example, of a very basic drug-trafficking chain conspiracy.105 
The drug cultivator/manufacturer deals exclusively with a large-scale drug traf-
ficker. The trafficker then deals exclusively with smaller-scale distributors. The 
drug cultivator/manufacturer never has any contact with, or knowledge of, the 
smaller-scale distributors. Despite the fact that the drug cultivator/manufacturer 
and smaller-scale distributors were parties to two separate and distinct agree-
ments with a third party—the large-scale trafficker—they are part of the same, 
single drug-trafficking chain conspiracy.106 
 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has stated that “[a] con-
spiracy may pursue multiple schemes with different modi operandi without di-
viding into multiple conspiracies, as long as there is a single objective,” though 
                                                        
102  Id. at 773. 
103  Id. at 776. 
104  Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947). 
105  A “chain conspiracy” is: 
A single conspiracy in which each person is responsible for a distinct act within the overall plan, 
such as an agreement to produce, import, and distribute narcotics in which each person performs 
only one function. All participants are interested in the overall scheme and liable for all other 
participants’ acts in furtherance of that scheme. 
Chain Conspiracy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
106  See Blumenthal, 332 U.S. at 558 (discussing a conspiracy to sell whiskey at unlawful 
prices: “By their separate agreements, if such they were, they became parties to the larger 
common plan, joined together by their knowledge of its essential features and broad scope, 
though not of its exact limits, and by their common single goal.”); see also United States v. 
Kelly, 892 F.2d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 1989) (“The government’s theory at trial was that a classic 
chain conspiracy was created, where a product is first transported, then refined, and then dis-
tributed to the ultimate user.”); United States v. Smith, 789 F.2d 196, 200 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(“[A] finding of a master conspiracy with sub-schemes does not constitute a finding of mul-
tiple, unrelated conspiracies . . . .”). 
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the court also warned that the objective “should not be defined in [terms] too 
narrow or specific.”107 
 Research reveals no cases in which the Nevada Supreme Court has tackled 
the issue of whether an agreement constitutes a single conspiracy or encom-
passes multiple conspiracies. Nevertheless, it is important for prosecutors to 
charge any such conspiracy in the proper manner because, like the United 
States Supreme Court, the Nevada Supreme Court has held that “reversible er-
ror exists . . . where the variance between the charge and proof was such as to 
affect the substantial rights of the accused.”108 
Should the Nevada Supreme Court take cues from the United States Su-
preme Court’s opinion in Blumenthal, when determining whether defendants 
were members of a single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies, it will likely 
look to whether the charged participants: (1) knew of the essential nature of the 
overall scheme; and (2) were sufficiently connected to the scheme. 
 Let us again consider the Miller Ring hypothetical involving Miller, Santi-
ago, Amaya, Smith, and Jones. Quite obviously, Miller, Santiago, and Ama-
ya—participants in each of the staged accident frauds—played roles in an over-
all scheme to fraudulently obtain insurance payouts. Because Smith 
participated in two of the accidents, a jury could reasonably infer that he was 
aware of the overall scheme, involving accidents other than those in which he 
was directly involved. On the other hand, Jones’s involvement in a single acci-
dent, on its own, is not likely to support an inference that she was aware of the 
larger conspiracy. 
 Should there be evidence that Jones knew she was part of a larger conspir-
acy; the question becomes whether she was sufficiently connected to the larger 
conspiracy to be charged as a participant in it rather than as a participant in a 
smaller conspiracy that carried out the single staged accident in which she par-
ticipated. As noted above, the squat cars are frequently filled with passengers in 
order to maximize any payout received from an insurance company. A strong 
argument can be made that Jones was sufficiently connected to the overall 
scheme. Jones risked her life in furtherance of the conspiracy’s goals. Addi-
tionally, she was a necessary participant for the filing of multiple insurance 
claims. Moreover, she carried out the scheme at the direction of the capper in-
volved in all of the accidents, and in cooperation with at least one other indi-
vidual who participated in staging each of the accidents carried out in connec-
tion with the overall scheme. 
                                                        
107  United States v. Hemphill, 514 F.3d 1350, 1364 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
108  State v. Jones, 605 P.2d 202, 204 (Nev. 1980). This holding was based, in part, on Neva-
da Revised Statute § 173.075 requirement that “[t]he indictment or the information [consist 
of] a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the of-
fense charged.” NEV. REV. STAT. § 173.075(1) (2015). The Court further noted that, in the 
past, it has “looked to determine whether the challenge to the indictment was brought before 
trial or after trial and ha[s] said that reduced standards apply to the sufficiency of indictments 
challenged after trial in contrast to pre-trial challenges.” Jones, 605 P.2d at 204. 
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2.   Coconspirator Vicarious Liability 
 Once the scope of one or more conspiracies is established, the prosecution 
must often determine the extent to which one coconspirator—Mary Jones in 
our present hypothetical—can be held vicariously liable for the conduct of her 
coconspirators. 
 In Bolden v. State, the Nevada Supreme Court thoroughly addressed the is-
sue of vicarious liability for coconspirators.109 The Court began its analysis by 
declining to adopt the United States Supreme Court’s theory of coconspirator 
vicarious-liability law applicable to federal conspiracy charges. That theory—
known as the federal Pinkerton Rule or “the natural and probable consequences 
doctrine”—imposes liability on a coconspirator for specific-intent offenses that 
were reasonably foreseeable and performed in furtherance of the conspiracy.110 
 The Nevada Supreme Court then explained that “vicarious coconspirator 
liability may be properly imposed for general intent crimes only when the 
crime in question was a ‘reasonably foreseeable consequence’ of the object of 
the conspiracy.”111 At the same time, the Court cautioned the prosecution that it 
would “not hesitate to revisit the doctrine’s applicability to general intent 
crimes if it appears that the theory of liability is alleged for crimes too far re-
moved and attenuated from the object of the conspiracy.”112 
 The Court went on to address specific-intent crimes, holding that “a de-
fendant may not be held criminally liable for the specific intent crime commit-
ted by a coconspirator simply because that crime was a natural and probable 
consequence of the object of the conspiracy.”113 Instead, the prosecution “must 
show that the defendant actually possessed the requisite statutory intent.”114 
 Applying the Nevada Supreme Court’s ruling to the Miller Ring hypothet-
ical, determining whether Joe Smith can be held liable for the criminal conduct 
of all of the Miller Ring participants first requires deciding whether each of the 
crimes committed by the Miller Ring’s members is a general- or a specific-
intent crime. 
     General intent is “the intent to do that which the law prohibits. It is not neces-
sary for the prosecution to prove that the defendant intended the precise harm or 
the precise result which eventuated.” . . . [S]pecific intent is ‘the intent to ac-
complish the precise act which the law prohibits. . . .To hold a defendant crimi-
nally liable for a specific intent crime, Nevada requires proof that he possessed 
the state of mind required by the statutory definition of the crime.115 
                                                        
109  Bolden v. State, 124 P.3d 191, 196–99 (Nev. 2005). 
110  Id. at 197. 
111  Id. at 201 (emphasis added). 
112  Id. 
113  Id. at 200. 
114  Id. at 200–01. 
115  Id. at 201 (quoting General Intent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)). 
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 As discussed above, staged-accident rings often commit numerous offens-
es, ranging from insurance fraud, theft, and obtaining money by false pretenses 
to battery with a deadly weapon and murder.116 A review of general hornbook 
law, the Nevada Revised Statutes, and Nevada Supreme Court case law assists 
in characterizing each of those crimes as a general intent crime or a specific in-
tent crime. 
 While the Nevada Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether 
the crime of insurance fraud is a general- or specific-intent crime, it is generally 
understood that “the mens rea for fraud is ‘specific intent to defraud’ ”117 More-
over, “[a]t common law, the specific-intent crimes were robbery, assault, lar-
ceny, burglary, forgery, false pretenses, embezzlement, attempt, solicitation, 
and conspiracy.”118 Thus, the Nevada Supreme Court would likely conclude 
that the crime of insurance fraud occurs only when a defendant acts with the 
specific intent to defraud an insurer. Similarly, theft or obtaining money by 
false pretenses requires the specific intent to defraud.119 
 In Byars v. State, the Nevada Supreme Court followed California’s lead, 
clarifying that battery is a general-intent crime and explained that “the prosecu-
tor need only prove that ‘the defendant actually intend[ed] to commit a willful 
and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another.’ ”120 The ad-
dition of the deadly weapon enhancement does not transform the crime into a 
specific-intent crime.121 Similarly, the crime of second-degree murder does not 
require the specific intent to kill.122 
 Having established the crimes committed and the mens rea required for 
those crimes, the question becomes: To what extent can a defendant be held 
criminally liable for the conduct of his or her conspirator(s)? Again using the 
Miller Ring hypothetical, this issue can be analyzed by determining to what ex-
tent, if any, Joe Smith, a participant in the June 1, 1991 and December 31, 1991 
staged accidents, can be held criminally liable for any crimes stemming from 
the acts of his coconspirators when they staged the fatal June 17, 1992 accident. 
 Smith was a participant in the Miller Ring’s large, overall scheme to stage 
multiple accidents in order to fraudulently obtain insurance payouts. Let us as-
sume that, sometime after the fatal June 17, 1992 accident but before law en-
                                                        
116  See supra Part II. 
117  Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1985 (2006). 
118  Specific Intent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). 
119  NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.0832(1)(c) (2015) (theft by material misrepresentation); id. 
§ 205.380(1) (obtaining money by false pretenses); Schertz v. State, 849 P.2d 1058, 1060 
(Nev. 1993) (setting forth the elements of obtaining money by false pretenses). 
120  Byars v. State, 336 P.3d 939, 949 (Nev. 2014) (quoting People v. Lara, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
402, 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)). 
121  See Coats v. State, 643 P.2d 1225, 1226 (Nev. 1982) (discussing that the addition of a 
deadly weapon enhancement does not transform the general intent crime of robbery into a 
specific intent crime). 
122  Hancock v. State, 397 P.2d 181, 182 (Nev. 1964). Manslaughter is also a general intent 
crime. Id. 
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forcement discovered the true nature of the accident, Miller—in accordance 
with the overall plan of the large conspiracy—made claims for insurance bene-
fits on behalf of the participants in the accident. 
 It can reasonably be anticipated that the participants in the June 17, 1992 
staging will face charges of insurance fraud, theft or obtaining money by false 
pretenses, battery with a deadly weapon, and homicide—most likely, second 
degree murder. As explained above, a jury could find that one who stages an 
accident resulting in death used his or her vehicle as a deadly weapon and acted 
with a “general malignant recklessness of others’ lives and safety or disregard 
of social duty.”123 As a member of the large overall Miller Ring conspiracy, 
Smith could be held liable only for the acts of his coconspirators if he pos-
sessed the requisite statutory intent. 
 Since battery with a deadly weapon and second degree murder are general-
intent crimes, the prosecution would be required to prove that Smith intended 
to do that which the law prohibits—not that he intended to accomplish the pre-
cise act which the law prohibits.124 There can be little argument with the fact 
that Smith intended to carry out acts in furtherance of the Miller Ring’s overall 
plan to fraudulently obtain insurance payouts. He intentionally drove a squat 
car for one accident, and he was a passenger, for the purpose of maximizing 
payouts, in another. Accordingly, Smith acted with the mens rea required for 
him to be held criminally liable for other acts of battery and/or murder commit-
ted by coconspirators in furtherance of the overall conspiracy. 
 Since insurance fraud and theft or obtaining money by false pretenses are 
specific-intent crimes, the prosecution would be required to prove that Smith 
acted with the intent to defraud an insurer. Once the prosecution proves that the 
accidents were staged, there should be little problem proving that Smith carried 
out his actions with the intent to defraud an insurer; there is simply no other 
logical reason to stage an accident. Thus, Smith also acted with the mens rea 
required for him to be held criminally liable for any acts of theft or obtaining 
money by false pretenses that emanated from the fatal accident in which he did 
not directly participate. 
D.   Racketeering Conspiracy 
 Assume for the purposes of this section that all of the participants who 
staged accidents in connection with the Miller Ring were part of a single con-
spiracy designed to stage accidents and defraud insurers. In other words, each 
member of the conspiracy participated in each staged accident. With those 
facts, in a single case, all of the defendants can be charged for all of their crim-
inal activities; there is no multiple conspiracy issue. 
 In order to see how Nevada’s racketeering statutes can affect the scope of a 
criminal case, let us take that tidy Miller Ring hypothetical a step further. Imag-
                                                        
123  See supra Part II. 
124  See Bolden v. State, 124 P.3d 191, 201 (Nev. 2005). 
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ine that, in addition to heading the conspiracy to defraud insurers, over that 
same three-year period when the accidents were being staged, Miller was also 
conspiring with an entirely different individual, Jane Doe, to use his office to 
perpetrate numerous acts of mortgage fraud. Specifically, Miller and Doe con-
spired to make false statements in mortgage applications in order to defraud 
housing lenders, with Doe working to recruit applicants and Miller filling out 
and submitting to the lenders the requisite paperwork. 
 Finally, let us also imagine that Doe and the staged-accident participants, 
other than Miller, knew nothing about one another’s activities or existence. 
Here, we have two separate and distinct traditional—as opposed to racketeer-
ing—conspiracies: (1) the staged-accident conspiracy; and (2) the mortgage 
fraud conspiracy. 
 The question becomes: Can a prosecutor in a single criminal case charge 
all of the members of each conspiracy for all crimes involving Miller? Apply-
ing Nevada traditional-conspiracy laws, the prosecutor runs the risk that the 
court would answer in the negative on the grounds that there is no discernible 
basis for joinder of the separate and distinct conspiracies.125 Aside from Miller, 
there is no evidence that the coconspirators knew of any overall plan to perpe-
trate distinct frauds. The addition of a racketeering conspiracy charge, however, 
alters our analysis. 
 Nevada’s racketeering statutes provide for substantive racketeering offens-
es, as well as the offense of conspiracy to commit racketeering.126 For the pur-
poses of this Article, it is important to distinguish those “substantive” racket-
eering offenses from the racketeering conspiracy offense. NRS 207.400(1) 
establishes several substantive racketeering offenses.127 NRS 207.400(1)(c) ad-
                                                        
125  See supra Part III.C.1. 
126  NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.350–.520 (2015). 
127  Id. § 207.400(1)(a)(i), sets forth the substantive racketeering offenses as follows: 
1. It is unlawful for a person: 
(a) Who has with criminal intent received any proceeds derived, directly or indirectly, from 
racketeering activity to use or invest, whether directly or indirectly, any part of the pro-
ceeds, or the proceeds derived from the investment or use thereof, in the acquisition of: 
(1) Any title to or any right, interest or equity in real property; or 
(2) Any interest in or the establishment or operation of any enterprise. 
(b) Through racketeering activity to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest 
in or control of any enterprise. 
(c) Who is employed by or associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate, directly 
or indirectly, in: 
(1) The affairs of the enterprise through racketeering activity; or 
(2) Racketeering activity through the affairs of the enterprise. 
(d) Intentionally to organize, manage, direct, supervise or finance a criminal syndicate. 
(e) Knowingly to incite or induce others to engage in violence or intimidation to promote or 
further the criminal objectives of the criminal syndicate. 
(f) To furnish advice, assistance or direction in the conduct, financing or management of 
the affairs of the criminal syndicate with the intent to promote or further the criminal objec-
tives of the syndicate. 
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dresses one of the more commonly charged substantive racketeering offens-
es.128 It makes it unlawful for a person employed by or associated with any en-
terprise to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in “(1) The affairs of 
the enterprise through racketeering activity, or (2) Racketeering activity 
through the affairs of the enterprise.”129 NRS 207.400(1)(j) makes it unlawful 
for anyone to conspire to commit a substantive racketeering offense. 
 In order to prove that defendants conspired to commit a substantive racket-
eering offense—namely, NRS 207.400(1)(c)—in violation of NRS 
207.400(1)(j), the prosecution must prove the following: 
(1) Existence of an enterprise; 
(2) Employment by or association with enterprise; 
(3) Participation in (a) the affairs of the enterprise through racketeering activity, 
or (b) racketeering activity through the affairs of the enterprise; and 
(4) Conspiring with others for the purpose of carrying out criminal conduct sat-
isfying elements i through iii.130 
A finding that a defendant conspired to violate NRS 207.400(1)(c) does not 
require a finding of the commission of two or more crimes related to racketeer-
ing.131 A closer examination of each element reveals the issues that arise when 
charging a staged-accident ring member with conspiracy to commit a substan-
tive racketeering offense. 
                                                                                                                                 
(g) Intentionally to promote or further the criminal objectives of a criminal syndicate by in-
ducing the commission of an act or the omission of an act by a public officer or employee 
which violates his or her official duty. 
(h) To transport property, to attempt to transport property or to provide property to another 
person knowing that the other person intends to use the property to further racketeering ac-
tivity. 
(i) Who knows that property represents proceeds of, or is directly or indirectly derived 
from, any unlawful activity to conduct or attempt to conduct any transaction involving the 
property: 
(1) With the intent to further racketeering activity; or 
(2) With the knowledge that the transaction conceals the location, source, ownership 
or control of the property. 
128  See e.g., Balgas v. State, No. 65512, 2016 WL 207617, at *1 (Nev. Jan. 15, 2016); 
Ahearn v. State, No. 66123, 2016 WL 1109110, at *1 (Nev. Mar. 18, 2016). 
129  NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.400(1)(c) (2015). 
130  It should be clarified that, while the case law discussed herein relates to racketeering con-
spiracies in which the participants both agree to commit a substantive racketeering offense 
and actually carry out the agreed upon substantive offense, there may be situations in which 
one can be convicted of conspiring to commit a substantive racketeering offense without 
having committed that substantive offense; the mere agreement would constitute the con-
spiracy. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.400(1)(c), (j) (2015).  
131  Ahearn, 2016 WL 110911, at *3. Additionally, unlike the federal crime of racketeering, 
Nevada racketeering law does not require a finding that the defendant was “involved in di-
recting the broader operation or management of the enterprise.” Id. (citing Reves v. Ernst & 
Young, 507 U.S. 170, 179, 185 (1993)). In support of that conclusion, the Nevada Supreme 
Court explained that Nevada’s racketeering laws “lack[] the ‘in the conduct’ language [of 18 
U.S.C. § 1962(c)] and thus the management requirement.” Id. 
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1.   Existence of an Enterprise 
 Nevada courts presiding over staged-accident prosecutions are likely to be 
confronted with the issue of whether a loosely organized crime ring such as 
Miller’s hypothetical ring (encompassing both insurance and mortgage fraud 
conspiracies) constitutes an “enterprise,” as contemplated by Nevada’s racket-
eering statutes. NRS 207.380 defines the term “enterprise” as follows: 
1. Any natural person, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business 
trust or other legal entity; and 
2. Any union, association or other group of persons associated in fact although 
not a legal entity. 
The term includes illicit as well as licit enterprises and governmental as well as 
other entities.132 
Minutes from Nevada’s 1983 legislative session indicate that Nevada’s 
racketeering laws were largely influenced by similar, existing federal law, ex-
isting Arizona law, and law that was also being proposed in 1983 for the state 
of Illinois.133 
 Nevada’s definition of the term “enterprise” is in many ways similar to that 
of the federal, Arizona, and Illinois racketeering statutes.134 While Nevada Su-
preme Court case law discussing racketeering enterprises is scarce, the United 
States Supreme Court has analyzed the breadth of the term’s definition with re-
spect to federal racketeering law. Where Nevada’s definition of racketeering 
tracks the federal definition, the United States Supreme Court’s thorough anal-
                                                        
132  NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.380 (2015). 
133  Hearing on A.B. 124 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Jud., 1983 Leg., 66th Sess. 6–7 (Nev. 
1983) (statement of Brian Hutchins, Deputy Attorney Gen.); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–65 
(2012). 
134  Federal law provides that an “enterprise” is “any individual, parternship, corporation, 
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact 
although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). Under Arizona law, an “enterprise” is de-
fined as “any corporation, partnership, association, labor union or other legal entity or any 
group of persons associated in fact although not a legal entity. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-
2301(D)(2) (2015). Illinois law provides: 
“Enterprise” includes: 
(1) any partnership, corporation, association, business or charitable trust, or other legal enti-
ty; and 
(2) any group of individuals or other legal entities, or any combination thereof, associated 
in fact although not itself a legal entity. An association in fact must be held together by a 
common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct, and it may be associated together for 
purposes that are both legal and illegal. An association in fact must: 
 (A) have an ongoing organization or structure, either formal or informal; 
(B) the various members of the group must function as a continuing unit, even if the 
group changes membership by gaining or losing members over time; and 
 (C) have an ascertainable structure distinct from  that inherent in the conduct of a pat-
tern of predicate activity. 
As used in this Article, “enterprise” includes licit and illicit enterprises. 
720 ILL.COMP. STAT. 5/33G-3(b) (2013). 
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ysis of that language may prove instructive for Nevada courts confronted with 
issues of statutory interpretation. 
 In Boyle v. United States, the United States Supreme Court tackled the is-
sue of “whether an association-in-fact enterprise135 under the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., must 
have an ascertainable structure beyond that inherent in the pattern of racketeer-
ing activity in which it engages.”136 The facts of the case are as follows. 
 Throughout the 1990s, several individuals participated in a series of night-
deposit-box thefts carried out in New York, New Jersey, Ohio, and Wiscon-
sin.137 The thefts were carried out by a core group, along with others who par-
ticipated from time to time.138 Before each theft, a group of the participants 
would meet to gather tools used to perpetrate the crimes and assign roles to the 
participants.139 The Court explained, “[t]he group was loosely and informally 
organized. It does not appear to have had a leader or hierarchy; nor does it ap-
pear that the participants ever formulated any long-term master plan or agree-
ment.”140 Prior to the petitioner’s involvement, the core group had committed 
more than thirty thefts.141 By 1994, the petitioner joined the group and partici-
pated in numerous thefts over the subsequent five years.142 
 The petitioner was indicted on numerous charges, including “participation 
in the conduct of the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering 
activity,”143 and conspiracy to commit that offense.144 The trial court denied the 
petitioner’s request that the jury be instructed that “the Government was re-
quired to prove that the enterprise had an ongoing organization, a core mem-
bership that functioned as a continuing unit, and an ascertainable structural hi-
erarchy distinct from the charged predicate acts.”145 The petitioner was 
                                                        
135  An “association-in-fact enterprise” is defined as follows: “Under RICO, a group of peo-
ple or entities that have not formed a legal entity, but that have a common or shared purpose, 
and maintain an ongoing organizational structure through which the associates function as a 
continuing unit.” Association-in-fact Enterprise, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
136  Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 940–41 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
137  Id. at 941. 
138  Id. 
139  Id. 
140  Id. 
141  Id. 
142  Id. 
143  Id. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2012), which is comparable to NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.400(1)(c) 
(2015), states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or 
the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly 
or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity 
or collection of unlawful debt. 
144  Boyle, 556 U.S. at 941; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), which is comparable to NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 207.400(1)(j), states: “It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any 
of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.” 
145  Boyle, 556 U.S. at 943 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
17 NEV.L.J. 459, KOVAC FINAL.DOCX 4/5/17  11:11 AM 
Spring 2017] STAGED-ACCIDENT INSURANCE SCHEMES 487 
convicted of the racketeering charges, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the conviction.146 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 
“to resolve conflicts among the Courts of Appeals concerning the meaning of a 
RICO enterprise.”147 
 The Court rejected the dissent’s position that the definition of a RICO en-
terprise is limited to business-like entities.148 The Court also rejected the peti-
tioner’s contention that an enterprise must have  
structural attributes, such as a structural hierarchy, role differentiation, a unique 
modus operandi, a chain of command, professionalism and sophistication of or-
ganization, diversity and complexity of crimes, membership dues, rules and reg-
ulations, uncharged or additional crimes aside from predicate acts, an internal 
discipline mechanism, regular meetings regarding enterprise affairs, an enter-
prise name, and induction or initiation ceremonies and rituals.149 
 The Court explained that, instead, an enterprise must have: (1) a purpose, 
(2) relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and (3) longevity 
sufficient to permit the associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.150 Accord-
ing to the Court, “[m]embers of the group need not have fixed roles; different 
members may perform different roles at different times.”151 
 Additionally, the Court explained that “the existence of an enterprise is an 
element distinct from the pattern of racketeering activity and ‘proof of one does 
not necessarily establish the other.’ ”152 The Court noted, however, that the ex-
istence of an enterprise may be inferred from evidence showing that persons 
associated with it engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity.153 To that end, 
the Court ruled that the trial court “did not err in instructing the jury that the ex-
istence of an association-in-fact is oftentimes more readily proven by what it 
does, rather than by abstract analysis of its structure.”154 
 There should be little doubt that Nevada courts are likely to follow the lead 
of the United States Supreme Court and adopt a similarly broad definition of 
the term “enterprise,” as that term is used in relation to Nevada’s racketeering 
laws. A comparison of Nevada and federal racketeering laws supports that con-
clusion. 
 The federal racketeering laws address the activities of enterprises—no oth-
er groups.155 Nevada racketeering laws, however, differentiate enterprises from 
criminal syndicates.156 
                                                        
146  Id. 
147  Id. 
148  Id. at 945. 
149  Id. at 948 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
150  Id. at 946. 
151  Id. at 948. 
152  Id. at 947 (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981)). 
153  Id. 
154  Id. at 951 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
155  See U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (2012). 
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 As discussed above, Nevada’s definition of enterprise is nearly identical to 
that of the federal racketeering laws. But the Nevada Revised Statutes, unlike 
the United States Code, also define a criminal syndicate as “any combination of 
persons, so structured that the organization will continue its operation even if 
individual members enter or leave the organization, which engages in or has the 
purpose of engaging in racketeering activity.”157 While it is understandable that 
there may be some confusion as to whether a federal RICO enterprise requires 
an organized structure, there is no question that it is not required under Neva-
da’s definition of a racketeering enterprise. If such a structure was required, 
there would be no need for the legislature to differentiate an enterprise (which 
includes no mention of an organized structure) from a criminal syndicate 
(which expressly requires an organized structure); a conclusion to the contrary 
would render them one and the same.158 For these reasons, Nevada courts are 
likely to interpret Nevada’s definition of the term “enterprise” at least as broad-
ly as the United State Supreme Court interprets the same term as used in federal 
racketeering laws. 
 With that in mind, let us again turn to the hypothetical Miller Insurance and 
Mortgage Fraud Ring. Applying the enterprise elements set forth in Boyle, it is 
clear that Miller’s Ring constitutes an enterprise. The enterprise had an overall 
purpose of obtaining money through Miller’s law office by fraudulent means. 
Additionally, there were relationships among those associated with the enter-
prise; all of the participants’ unlawful conduct ultimately led to Miller’s fraudu-
lent efforts to obtain money. Finally, the longevity requirement is satisfied, as 
the crimes were carried out over a three-year period and, likely, would have 
continued, had the June 17, 1992 accident not resulted in a fatality. 
2.   Employment by or Association with Enterprise 
 In our hypothetical, it is clear that Doe was associated with or employed by 
Miller’s enterprise. Doe was responsible for recruiting the loan applicants Mil-
ler needed in order to submit fraudulent loan applications. Thus, the employ-
ment/association element of NRS 207.400(1)(j) has been satisfied. 
3.   Participation in the Affairs of the Enterprise Through Racketeering 
Activity or Racketeering Activity Through the Affairs of the Enterprise 
 “Racketeering activity” means: 
engaging in at least two crimes related to racketeering that have the same or sim-
ilar pattern, intents, results, accomplices, victims or methods of commission, or 
                                                                                                                                 
156  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.370 (2015) (defining criminal syndicate); id. § 207.380 (de-
fining enterprise). 
157  Id. § 207.370. 
158  See Leven v. Frey, 168 P.3d 712, 716 (Nev. 2007) (“[S]tatutory interpretation should not 
render any part of a statute meaningless, and a statute’s language should not be read to pro-
duce absurd or unreasonable results.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated 
incidents, if at least one of the incidents occurred after July 1, 1983, and the last 
of the incidents occurred within 5 years after a prior commission of a crime re-
lated to racketeering.159 
The crimes related to racketeering include insurance fraud, felony battery, 
murder, and obtaining possession of money or property valued at $650 or more 
by means of false pretenses.160 
 During Nevada’s 1983 legislative session, two examples of conduct that 
satisfies the participation requirement were discussed: 
For example, there’s a bar in some town. The owners, or people working there 
might be selling narcotics or something else illegal from this legitimate estab-
lishment. Basically, they would be conducting racketeering through their busi-
ness. 
The second situation comes from U.S. vs. Elliot, 571 Fed. 2d 880, it’s a 
Fifth Circuit Fed. Appellate Court decision in 1980. In that case, there was a 
group of individuals whose basic desire was to make money. They combined 
and performed different jobs for the organization. They divided people into dif-
ferent departments of this business. They had not only an administrative level, 
but they also had a department that was involved with stolen merchandise and 
fencing; another department involved with narcotics sales and another that was 
involved with murder and obstruction of justice. All of these were efforts to help 
the organization gain money, thus they were participating in the affairs of the 
enterprise through racketeering activity.161 
 Given the plain language of the racketeering statutes and the examples 
provided by the Nevada legislature, it is clear that members of the hypothetical 
Miller Ring participate in the affairs of their enterprise (Miller’s law practice), 
through racketeering activity (insurance fraud, theft, obtaining money by false 
pretenses, and less obviously, battery with a deadly weapon and murder). 
4.   Conspiring with Others for the Carrying out of Criminal Conduct 
Satisfying Elements 1 Through 3 
 NRS 207.400(1)(j)—Nevada’s racketeering conspiracy statute—allows the 
prosecution to avoid the pleading and joinder problems it normally faces when 
dealing with multiple traditional conspiracies, as opposed to racketeering con-
spiracies.162 As discussed above, the prosecution is generally prohibited from 
charging multiple, distinct conspiracies in a single charge.163 NRS 
                                                        
159  NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.390 (2015). 
160  Id. § 207.360. 
161  Hearing on A.B. 124 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 62nd Leg. Sess. 8 (1983). 
Any attempt to use the latter example in support of an argument that a Nevada enterprise 
must have the type of structure rejected in Boyle falls flat. The two examples discussed by 
the Nevada Legislature were illustrative, not exclusive. Moreover, as discussed above, any 
such argument would render the term “criminal syndicate” a nullity. 
162  NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.400(1)(j) (2015). 
163  See supra Part III.C.1. 
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207.400(1)(j), however, allows the prosecution to charge defendants for con-
spiring to participate in the affairs of an enterprise with knowledge that the goal 
of the conspiracy was the commission of a substantive racketeering offense, 
such as violation of NRS 207.400(1)(c).164 This is true even if the defendants 
being charged participated in the enterprise’s affairs through what would oth-
erwise be considered separate and distinct traditional conspiracies. 
 In United States v. Maloney, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals dis-
cussed this principle as it applies to federal racketeering conspiracy charges.165 
The relevant facts of Maloney were as follows. 
 Thomas J. Maloney was a judge in Cook County, Illinois from 1977 
through 1990.166 During his time on the bench, he accepted bribes and agreed to 
fix four cases, including three murder cases.167 
 The first bribe occurred in 1981.168 Chicago Alderman Fred Roti and Ward 
Secretary Pat Marcy contacted attorney Robert Cooley to defend hit man Lenny 
Chow from an attempted murder charge, which ultimately became a murder 
charge after the victim passed away.169 Marcy assured Cooley that Maloney 
could be bribed.170 Maloney did, in fact, make improper rulings resulting in 
Chow’s acquittal in exchange for money received from Marcy.171 
 The remaining three bribes took place between 1982 and 1985.172 In each 
of those instances, Maloney fixed cases for attorney William Swano.173 
 As a result, Maloney was convicted of a number of federal crimes, includ-
ing racketeering and racketeering conspiracy.174 On appeal, Maloney made a 
number of arguments, including the argument that “the Chow case was improp-
erly included as part of the RICO conspiracy because it involved some partici-
pants, specifically Cooley and Marcy, who did not participate in the other pred-
icate acts.”175 In other words, Maloney argued that the prosecution improperly 
charged multiple conspiracies in a single case—one conspiracy that included 
the individuals involved in the Chow case, and another conspiracy that included 
the individuals involved in the remaining three cases that were fixed. 
 The Seventh Circuit rejected that argument, explaining that the federal 
RICO conspiracy statute “is capable of providing for the linkage in one pro-
ceeding of a number of otherwise distinct crimes and/or conspiracies through 
                                                        
164  NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.400(1)(j) (2015). 
165  United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645, 664–65 (7th Cir. 1995). 
166  Id. at 650. 
167  Id. 
168  Id. 
169  Id. 
170  Id. 
171  Id. 
172  Id. at 650–51. 
173  Id. 
174  Id. at 649. 
175  Id. at 664. 
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the concept of enterprise conspiracy.”176 According to the Seventh Circuit, “a 
series of agreements that under pre-RICO law would constitute multiple con-
spiracies could under RICO be tried as a single ‘enterprise’ conspiracy if the 
defendants have agreed to commit a substantive RICO offense.”177 
 Applying the facts in Maloney to those principles, the Seventh Circuit 
found that inclusion of all of the predicate acts of racketeering was permissible 
because all of the participants in the RICO conspiracy worked with Maloney in 
his capacity as a judge with a desire to “effect a corruption of that office.”178 In 
other words, all of the named individuals participated in the affairs of an enter-
prise, the goal of which was to commit multiple acts of racketeering for the 
purpose of fixing cases. 
 Applying the facts of the hypothetical Miller Insurance and Mortgage 
Fraud Ring to those principles, the prosecution could file a racketeering con-
spiracy charge asserting that the enterprise’s overall goal was to fraudulently 
obtain money through the use of Miller’s law practice. That assertion would be 
supported by the fact that the insurance claims and mortgage applications were 
processed through the use of his practice. With the enterprise characterized in 
such terms, the prosecution should be able to charge all of the participants with 
conspiring to commit racketeering in violation of NRS 207.400(1)(j). The pros-
ecution should also be able to use all of the crimes committed in furtherance of 
both the insurance fraud conspiracy and mortgage fraud conspiracy as the pred-
icate acts upon which the racketeering conspiracy charge is based. 
CONCLUSION 
 When multiple defendants commit a number of crimes, joinder issues can 
present prosecutors with challenging charging decisions. The addition of a tra-
ditional conspiracy charge and/or a racketeering conspiracy charge may resolve 
such issues. It is important to remember that, although all defendants can be 
charged for all crimes in a single criminal case, this should not be the sole basis 
for determining whether a single case should encompass all of the crimes 
committed by such complex crime rings. As another law review article has ex-
plained, when it comes to prosecuting organized crime, bigger is not always 
better.179 
As demonstrated by the facts of the Miller case, greed motivates accident 
stagers in ways most people would find difficult to imagine. One would hope 
that the average person would not risk a fraud conviction by telling a simple lie 
to an insurance company, let alone stage a car accident with a big rig. Accident 
stagers have a different way of thinking; greed trumps reason. To illustrate, a 
                                                        
176  Id. (quoting United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 501 (7th Cir. 1986)). 
177  Id. (citation omitted). 
178  Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
179  See generally, e.g., Paul Marcus, Re-Evaluating Large Multiple-Defendant Criminal 
Prosecutions, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 67 (2002). 
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Los Angeles Times article published a little more than one year after the fatal 
accident brought down his ring revealed that Gary Miller was sued by Equita-
ble Life Assurance Society (“Equitable”).180 The suit had no direct connection 
to the fraudulent insurance payouts Miller had obtained in conjunction with the 
staged accidents.181 No, Equitable was suing Miller to recover $85,000 in disa-
bility benefits Miller obtained for “job-related stress” that was the product of 
his arrest for murder and conspiracy.182 
                                                        
180  Julie Tamaki, Insurer Sues Attorney Accused of Murder, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 30, 1993), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1993-12-30/local/me-6819_1_disability-benefits [https://perma.cc 
/JY9C-8DCM]. 
181  Id. 
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